Equine Piroplasmosis Domestic Pathways Assessment (2011) by USDA, APHIS, VS, CEAH, NCRA et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Other Publications in Zoonotics and Wildlife
Disease Wildlife Disease and Zoonotics
2011
Equine Piroplasmosis Domestic Pathways
Assessment (2011)
USDA, APHIS, VS, CEAH, NCRA
Julie Gauthier
USDA, APHIS, VS, NCIE
Robert Harris
USDA, APHIS, VS, CEAH, NCRA
Angela James
USDA, APHIS, VS, CEAH, NCRA
Laurel Voelker
USDA, APHIS, VS, NCIE
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/zoonoticspub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Wildlife Disease and Zoonotics at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications in Zoonotics and Wildlife Disease by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
USDA, APHIS, VS, CEAH, NCRA; Gauthier, Julie; Harris, Robert; James, Angela; Voelker, Laurel; and Portacci, Katie, "Equine
Piroplasmosis Domestic Pathways Assessment (2011)" (2011). Other Publications in Zoonotics and Wildlife Disease. 181.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/zoonoticspub/181
Authors
USDA, APHIS, VS, CEAH, NCRA; Julie Gauthier; Robert Harris; Angela James; Laurel Voelker; and Katie
Portacci
This article is available at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/zoonoticspub/181
United States 
Department of 
Agriculture 
 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
 
Veterinary Services 
 
Centers for 
Epidemiology and 
Animal Health 
 
National Center for  
Risk Analysis 
 
April 2011 
 
 
` 
Equine Piroplasmosis 
Domestic Pathways 
Assessment (2011) 
  
 USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis 
Questions or comments on data analysis, contact: Dr. Katie Portacci (970) 494-7000: E-mail: CEAH@aphis.usda.gov 
Suggested bibliographic citation for this report:  
USDA. (2011). Equine piroplasmosis domestic pathways assessment 2011: pathways assessment for the 
spread of the causative agents of equine piroplasmosis from the movement of a horse from a quarantined 
premises within the contiguous United States. USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk 
Analysis. Fort Collins, CO. March 2011. 62 pages. 
 
Abstract: Equine piroplasmosis (EP) is a tick borne disease of equids. It is considered 
a foreign animal disease in the United States. However, from January 2009 through 
November 2010, 542 confirmed positive cases have been identified in 16 different 
States. This domestic pathways assessment evaluates the risk of releasing an EP 
pathogen (Theileria equi or Babesia caballi) from a quarantined premises through 
movement of horses. In addition, this assessment evaluates the risk of disease 
transmission by ticks, vertical transmission, or iatrogenic transmission. 
When an acaricide is applied correctly, the risk of EP transmission by ticks to a horse 
is low. In addition, infected reservoir hosts, environmental factors, and competent 
vectors must be present for the disease transmission cycle to occur. Vertical 
transmission of T. equi is considered a moderate risk pathway and the risk of vertical 
transmission of B. caballi is negligible. 
Iatrogenic transmission via whole blood transfusion, blood doping, commercial 
serum/blood plasma, and contaminated equipment poses the highest risk of disease 
transmission. Blood is an efficient vehicle of transmission for EP pathogens and even 
a small volume of blood can be infectious. Exposure of an uninfected horse to any of 
these pathways is likely to result in EP transmission. Iatrogenic exposure may be 
difficult to regulate. Management practices such as testing blood donors would help 
mitigate this risk but these practices vary throughout the equine industry.  
The overall risk of EP spread by the movement of a horse from a quarantined premises 
is moderate.  
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ACRONYMS 
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
cELISA competitive inhibition enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
CF complement fixation test 
EP equine piroplasmosis 
IFAT indirect fluorescence antibody test 
IPM integrated pest management  
LAMP loop-mediated isothermal amplification 
MAb monoclonal antibody 
NAHMS National Animal Health Monitoring System 
NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratories 
OIE World Organization for Animal Health 
PCR polymerase chain reaction 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
VS Veterinary Services 
DEFINITIONS 
confirmed positive horse A horse that has tested positive for an EP pathogen with either a complement fixation  
test (CF) or a competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (cELISA) conducted by 
NVSL. A horse can be classified as a confirmed positive case without showing 
evidence of clinical disease of EP. (USDA 2009) 
contiguous United States The 48 United States that have common land borders with each other. 
biocontainment Prevention of disease spread within or between operations. 
biosecurity Prevention of disease introduction. 
EP pathogen Babesia caballi or Theileria equi. 
exposed horse A horse in the same herd as a confirmed positive horse or a horse that has had recent 
direct and sustained contact with a confirmed positive horse, as determined by State 
and Federal regulatory officials in consultation with epidemiologist. (USDA 2009) 
exposure assessment The exposure assessment estimates the likelihood of exposure and the risk of 
transmission if an uninfected horse is exposed to the EP pathogen by: ticks, vertical 
transmission, or iatrogenic transmission of blood or blood components. 
exotic Not known to be present in the contiguous United States. 
gold standard Gold standard test refers to a diagnostic test or benchmark that is regarded as 
definitive. 
high risk This event would be very likely to occur. 
horse Equus caballus 
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iv Acronyms and Definitions 
infected undetected horse A horse that is infected but has been tested with either a complement fixation (CF) test 
or a competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (cELISA) conducted by NVSL 
and results indicate the animal is not infected.  
intrastadial transmission Transmission of B. caballi or T. equi to a horse by a tick that acquired the pathogen 
during the same lifecycle stage. 
known donor A horse used as a blood donor and whose identity is “known” by the teams performing 
the transfusion.  
low risk The event would be unlikely to occur. 
moderate risk This event would occur with an even probability. 
negligible risk The event would be unlikely to occur. 
operation An area of land managed as a unit by an individual, partnership, or hired manager. 
potential tick vector Any tick species considered competent to transmit B. caballi or T. equi to a horse. 
additions A horse purchased from outside an operation and transported to the purchasing 
operation for housing, training, breeding, riding, or racing. 
quarantined premises Premises with at least one confirmed positive case of EP and that is subject to the 
biosecurity measures outlined in VS Memorandum 555.20 low-risk premises. (USDA 
2009) 
race horse A horse whose primary use is competition on sanctioned or unsanctioned race tracks. 
release assessment The release assessment estimates the likelihood that an EP pathogen will be released 
from a quarantined premises. The pathways for release examined were confirmed 
positive horse and a test negative exposed horse.  
show/event horse A horse used primarily in competition other than racing. 
sanctioned racing Horseracing conducted by the approval and regulation of State authority and/or racing 
commissions.  
spread New infection of at least one horse or tick vector with an EP pathogen. 
trail and ranch horses Horses used for farm, ranch or other noncompetitive uses. 
transovarial transmission Transmission of B. caballi or T. equi from a female tick to its offspring by infection of the 
eggs in the ovaries of the tick. 
transstadial transmission Transmission of B. caballi or T. equi to an equid by a tick in a lifecycle stage 
subsequent to the stage in which the tick acquired the pathogen. 
unsanctioned racing Horseracing conducted without the approval and regulation of State authority or official 
racing commission.  
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Figure 1. Total number of horses confirmed positive with equine piroplasmosis from January 
2009 through November 2010. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Equine piroplasmosis (EP) is a tick borne disease of equids and is considered an exotic disease in 
the United States. From January 2009 through November 2010, 542 confirmed positive cases 
were identified in 16 different States (Figure 1). Of those, 412 cases were associated with one 
outbreak initiating in Texas. The National Equine Piroplasmosis Working Group, consisting of 
industry, State, and Federal representatives, developed long-term recommendations for the 
management and removal of EP in the United States. One recommendation was to conduct an 
assessment to estimate the risk of EP spread posed by the interstate movement of horses from a 
quarantined premises to events or other premises.  
Release Pathways 
This pathways assessment evaluates the risk of releasing an EP pathogen (Theileria equi or 
Babesia caballi) from a quarantined premises through movement of horses. The release pathways 
considered were:  
1) movement of confirmed positive horses, and 
2) movement of infected undetected horses. 
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The testing protocol outlined in VS Memorandum 555.20 results in a low risk that an infected 
horse will test negative for EP (i.e., infected undetected horse) when tested with both cELISA and 
CF. The risk is moderate if a horse is tested with cELISA alone. If a horse is confirmed positive, 
the likelihood that the horse is truly infected with an EP pathogen is high; therefore, the risk of 
releasing an EP pathogen via this pathway is high.  
Exposure Pathways 
The exposure pathways assessed for EP transmission to an uninfected horse were ticks, vertical 
transmission, and iatrogenic transmission via blood contamination. In this document, the risk 
associated with an exposure pathway is based on the ability of that pathway to result in transmission. 
Horse to horse contact alone is not sufficient for transmission of EP. If an EP pathogen is released 
onto a premises, the uninfected horse must be exposed to blood from an infected horse via mechanical 
or tick transmission.  
The risk is low that an infected tick 
would remain attached to a horse 
moving off a quarantined premises 
when acaricide is applied correctly. 
Within a tick population, EP 
infections quickly die out without the 
presence of infected hosts because 
each generation of tick must be 
exposed to the organism. Therefore, 
EP is only maintained if at least one 
infected horse is present in the 
population. As a result, the risk of 
continued spread of an EP pathogen 
by ticks alone is low. 
Vertical transmission of T. equi from mares is a moderate risk pathway. 
Because transmission has not occurred between mares infected with B. 
caballi and their offspring, vertical transmission of B. caballi is a 
considered negligible.  
Blood is an efficient vehicle of transmission for EP pathogens. Even a small volume of blood can be 
infectious. Of the iatrogenic exposure pathways assessed, whole blood transfusion, blood doping, 
commercial serum/blood plasma, and contaminated equipment are all considered high-risk 
pathways. Germplasm is the only iatrogenic exposure pathway considered in this assessment to 
pose a negligible risk.  
In order for a horse to become infected by the exposure pathways described above, the horse must 
have the opportunity for sufficient contact with an infected population. Biosecurity practices vary 
throughout the equine industry. As a result, it is difficult to estimate the impact of mitigation 
measures other than regulatory requirements. Because of the continued monitoring, acaricide 
treatment, and identification of confirmed positive horses as outlined in this document, these 
American dog tick 
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horses would have little opportunity to expose uninfected horses. In contrast, infected undetected 
horses have no requirements for identification. They also do not require acaricide treatment or 
additional testing after leaving the quarantined premises. This population poses a much greater 
risk of exposing uninfected horses to EP agents.  
Summary 
In summary, if an infected undetected horse releases EP from a quarantined premises, iatrogenic 
mechanisms pose the greatest risk for transmission to a new horse. This is due to the uncertainty 
about biosecurity practices, the large number of organisms present in a small volume of blood, 
and the small infectious dose. Iatrogenic transmission via blood or blood products has been the 
cause of several outbreaks worldwide. It is unknown how frequently practices such as blood 
doping or sharing of equipment occur throughout the industry. Currently, test negative horses 
leaving a quarantined premises have no requirements for identification or continued monitoring to 
ensure these horses are not infected undetected. The overall risk of this pathway is moderate. 
If a confirmed positive horse releases EP from a premises, iatrogenic transmission may still 
occur. In addition, vertical transmission may occur if these horses are bred. The overall risk posed 
by the movement of confirmed positive horses is moderate.  
 USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis 
4 Introduction  
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background _______________________________________________________  
The United States was considered free of equine piroplasmosis (EP) in 1988. Since 2009, 16 
States have identified at least one EP case related to previous importation or trace investigations 
from other affected premises. Of those cases identified, 124 cases have been associated with T. 
equi (Figure 2) and 6 cases have been associated with B. caballi (Figure 3). In addition, as of 
November 1, 2010, 412 horses (out of a total population of 2,489 horses tested) were confirmed 
positive to T. equi (Figure 4) associated with an outbreak from one-affected premises in Texas. 
Figure 2. The number of horses confirmed positive with T. equi in the United States from November 1, 
2009 through November 1, 2010, excluding those associated with the Texas outbreak. 
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Figure 4. Number of horses confirmed positive with T. equi associated with an outbreak 
initiating in Texas from October 2009 through November 2010. 
Figure 3. B. caballi confirmed positive horses from November 1, 2009 through November 1, 
2010. 
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The National Equine Piroplasmosis Working Group, which consists of industry, State, and 
Federal representatives, was established to provide guidance to USDA:APHIS:VS and the States 
to control EP. In April 2010, the group requested a risk assessment be conducted to estimate the 
risk of EP spread posed by horses moving off a quarantined premises.  
The objective of this assessment is to identify the likelihood that the interstate movement of a 
horse off a quarantined premises will result in at least one horse in a new location becoming 
infected with an EP pathogen. This risk assessment evaluates the efficacy of current management 
practices for quarantined premises, as well as an option to allow confirmed positive horses to 
attend shows, races, or other equid events. Results of this work will be provided to the National 
EP Working Group and VS to strengthen current management practices and inform policy.  
1.2. Methods ___________________________________________________________  
The process used in this assessment is a modification of OIE’s guidelines for import risk analysis 
(OIE 2008), which consists of a hazard identification, release assessment, exposure assessment, 
consequence assessment, and an overall risk estimation. Because the objective is to identify the 
likelihood of at least one horse becoming infected, this assessment does not consider the 
magnitude of the effect (i.e., biological or economic consequences) once a new horse becomes 
infected. Without this consequence assessment, this analysis is referred to as a “Pathways 
Assessment” rather than a “Risk Assessment.” A pathways assessment describes the biological 
pathways necessary for the pathogen to spread from the infected population to the uninfected 
population of concern, and the likelihood of these events occurring. The hazards identified are B. 
caballi and T. equi, the causative agents of EP.  
In this assessment, the infected population is defined as horses on quarantined premises that are 
infected with an EP pathogen. The infection in each of these horses might be confirmed by a 
positive EP test result, or it might be undetected because of a false negative EP test result. The 
uninfected population at risk is any uninfected horse exposed to the infected population through 
movement of an infected horse from a quarantined premises. The likelihood that a horse that tests 
negative on a quarantined premises is infected was estimated, based on USDA:APHIS:VS’ 
approved testing protocol, through a stochastic simulation model using risk and decision analysis 
software @RISK by Palisade Corporation (Palisade 2009).  
Published literature and reports from recent outbreaks were used to identify the potential release 
and exposure pathways. Appendix A. Literature Review of EP Release and Exposure summarizes 
the results of a literature review aimed at determining sources of introduction of EP to new areas 
and means of spread either following introduction or in an enzootic area. Worldwide, importation 
of infected horses is the only introduction pathway, which has been reported to lead to outbreaks 
of EP in regions in which the disease was not enzootic. As the table shows, EP has been shown to 
spread from infected to uninfected horses via ticks, vertical transmission, and iatrogenic 
transmission such as needle sharing or syringe reuse. 
  EP Domestic Pathways Assessment (2011) 
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The release assessment estimates the likelihood that an EP pathogen will leave a quarantined 
premises. The release pathways considered were: 
a. A confirmed positive horse temporarily leaving the premises 
b. An infected, undetected horse permanently leaving the premises 
Given that the pathogen successfully left a quarantined premises, the exposure assessment 
estimates the likelihood that exposure to a specific pathway would result in transmission to an 
uninfected horse. The exposure pathways considered include: 
a. Ticks 
• An infected tick attached to a horse leaving a quarantined premises 
• Establishment of infection in the tick population on a new premises 
b. Vertical transmission 
c. Iatrogenic transmission via blood or blood components such as:  
• Whole blood transfusion (for medical purposes) 
• Blood doping (for non-medical purposes) 
• Commercial serum/plasma products 
• Equipment (e.g., needles and dental or tattoo equipment) 
• Germplasm 
Infected ticks may attach to other hosts, which may move off a quarantined premises, however 
this assessment is specifically addressing the interstate movement of horses and did not consider 
other host movements off the premises. 
While the risk of transmission associated with each of these exposure pathways can be described 
(Figure 5), the likelihood of exposure to an EP pathogen is more difficult to estimate due to 
uncertainty about management practices throughout the industry or the use of biosecurity or other 
mitigation measures. The baseline mitigation measures evaluated were current Federal 
regulations and recommendations. A general description of risk specific to certain sectors was 
provided.  
 USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis 
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Quarantined 
PremisesAffected population
Release pathways
Exposure pathways
Consequence
v Confirmed positive horses
v Infected undetected horses
v Direct tranmsision
v Iatrogenic
v Infected tick
At least one naïve horse becomes 
infected
 
The overall estimation of risk is based on the risk of release, risk of transmission from exposure, 
and likelihood of exposure.  
1.3. Risk and Uncertainty Estimation ______________________________________  
For each pathway, the likelihood that the pathway would result in the EP pathogen leaving the 
premises (release) or infection of a new horse (exposure) was estimated through qualitative or 
quantitative methods. Both results were communicated through a qualitative risk ranking system 
described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definitions for risk estimates. 
Risk estimation 
Descriptive definition of  
qualitative results 
Probability outcome for  
quantitative results 
High This event would be very likely to occur >40% 
Moderate This event would occur with an even probability  1-39.999999% 
Low  The event would be unlikely to occur .000001-1% 
Negligible The event would almost certainly never occur <.000001% 
In addition, the degree of uncertainty was captured based on the level of information available for 
qualitative estimates (Table 2).  
Figure 5. Pathway scenario for the general equine population. 
  EP Domestic Pathways Assessment (2011) 
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Table 2. Level of uncertainty about the likelihood estimates. 
Uncertainty 
category Definition 
Low The data available are solid and complete. Multiple published references or reliable 
databases and records are available. Different sources are generally in agreement. 
Medium Some, but not complete data are available. A small number of published references 
or reliable databases and records are available. If personal communication or 
anecdotal evidence is used in combination with published information, then it is from 
multiple reliable sources that are generally in agreement.  
High No published data are available. The only evidence is in the form of personal 
communications, anecdotal reports, or unpublished data.  
1.4. Assumptions_______________________________________________________  
The baseline mitigation measures that were considered for the release assessment were based on 
the VS Memorandum 555.20. It is assumed that horses on quarantined premises will be treated as 
test negative horses on Low-Risk premises (as defined in the VS Memorandum), which initial 
intervention includes: 
• All exposed horses are tested for EP and negatives are retested 30 days later 
• A 10-foot separation is maintained between negative and positive horses 
• The facility is inspected by State animal health authority 
• Vegetation is minimized and an acaricide is applied 
• Treating horses with acaricide twice  
• Acaricide application is consistent with VS Memorandum 556.1.  
In addition, horses with a negative test within 30 days and with acaricide application within 14 
days can move off the premises permanently. No additional testing or treatment is required.  
VS Memorandum 555.20 does have provisions for the interstate movement of test-positive 
horses. Therefore, test-positive horses were assumed to move temporarily and consistent with a 
combination of draft measures outlined by the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC 2009) 
and USDA:APHIS:VS (unpublished). Management of grounds on the premises was not 
considered as a standard mitigation because it was not a standard recommendation. 
The mitigations applied to the movement of test positive horses in this assessment include: 
• A permit is issued by the State or Federal Animal Health Agency prior to movement. 
• Horses are spray treated with a pyrethroid not less than 24 hours or more than 14 
days prior to any movement. 
• Horses are sprayed with acaricide every 14-18 days while off the premises. 
• Horses have a unique identifier and their location and transport monitored. 
• Horses return within one day of finishing the event. 
• Horses will not be accepted as blood donors. 
• Foals born to positive mares will be maintained under hold order until they are 
weaned /separated from the mare and have negative cELISA, CF, and PCR tests at a 
minimum of 6 months of age, and met the requirements listed above. 
 USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis 
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2.  HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Epidemiology describes the distribution and determinants of a disease in the population. The 
epidemiology of a disease is an important component in estimating risk because it describes how 
a pathogen is transmitted as well as host susceptibility. In order for a disease to occur the 
appropriate agent, host, and environmental conditions must be present. Equine piroplasmosis is a 
tick-borne parasitic infection of horses, mules, donkeys and zebras (Friedhoff and Soulé 1996).  
2.1. Agents ____________________________________________________________  
Equine piroplasmosis is caused by the protozoan parasites Babesia caballi or Theileria equi. The 
etiologic agents of EP, B. caballi and T. equi, have complex life cycles that include obligate 
sexual stages in the guts of their tick vectors. Consequently, only ticks that are competent vectors 
(ticks that are capable of supporting the development of the parasite) biologically transmit these 
parasites.  
The nomenclature of T. equi (versus B. equi) has been debated due to the developmental phase of 
T. equi in the lymphocyte (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996). OIE guidelines state that: “Theileria equi 
was previously designated as Babesia equi but compelling evolutionary, morphologic, 
biochemical, and genetic evidence supports its reclassification as a Theileria” (OIE 2009a). This 
document will remain consistent with OIE terminology.  
The following table demonstrates some key characteristics and differences between the two 
organisms.  
Table 3. Characteristics and key differences between B. caballi and T. equi. 
 B. caballi T. equi 
Distribution in the United 
States; Nov 2009-Nov 2010 
(USDA Sit Rep, Nov 2010, 
unpublished) 
6 positive horses in 5 States  124 positive horses in 16 States 
plus an ongoing outbreak 
investigation originating from Texas 
that includes 412 horses  
Tick Transmission Zygotes can be found in various 
organs of tick vectors and must 
transmit transovarially from egg to 
larva to be found in the salivary 
glands (Uilenberg 2006) 
Zygotes develop in salivary glands 
of tick vector and not found in other 
tick organs; not transmitted 
transovarially from egg to larva 
(Uilenberg 2006) 
Vertical Transmission Intrauterine infections have been 
reported but are rare and usually 
lead to abortion (de Waal 1992) 
Mares can transmit the infection 
throughout their lives to their 
offspring, resulting in abortions, 
stillbirths or carrier offspring (de 
Waal 1992) 
Infection in horses Development does not include a 
lymphocyte stage (Uilenberg 2006) 
and does not cause adhesions of 
infected erythrocytes to vascular 
endothelium (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 
1996). 
Initial development in the 
lymphocyte with further 
development and asexual 
reproduction in erythrocytes 
(Uilenberg 2006) 
Incubation period 10 to 30 days (de Waal 1992) 12 to 19 days (de Waal 1992) 
Parasitemia 0.1-10% (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996) May be >20%, but 1-5% most 
common (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996) 
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 B. caballi T. equi 
Clinical Signs Infections are more likely to be 
unapparent or mild (Ali, Sugimoto 
et al. 1996). However, kinin 
releases may lead to cerebral 
babesiosos (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 
1996) 
Variable 
Immune Response  Once described as self-limiting but 
lasting up to 4 years after initial 
infection, however, may be lifelong 
but undetected by current tests 
(Rothschild and Knowles 2007) 
Cannot be eliminated from the 
body by the immune response; 
even with treatment the horses 
remain infected for life (Rothschild 
and Knowles 2007) 
Diagnosis: Blood Smear Merozoites are seen exclusively in 
erythrocytes and typically as pairs 
joined at the posterior end (de 
Waal 1992) 
In macrophages early in infection. 
Visualized in erythrocytes as 
merozoites in a Maltese-cross 
formation of 4 pyriform parasites 
(de Waal 1992) 
Diagnosis: serology  Higher Se/Sp on Complement 
Fixation compared to T. equi on CF 
Higher sensitive (Se) and specific 
(Sp) on cELISA compared to B. 
caballi on cELISA 
   
2.2. Host ______________________________________________________________  
2.1.1. Susceptibility 
Horses in endemic regions may have a low case fatality rate (5-10 percent) (Rothschild and 
Knowles 2007). However, the case fatality rate may increase significantly among naïve mature 
horses (Maurer 1962; Rothschild and Knowles 2007). Persistent infection of T. equi is thought to 
be a common cause of abortion in endemic regions (de Waal 1992; Lewis, Penzhorn et al. 1999). 
Susceptibility does not appear to vary with age (Acici, Umur et al. 2008) or sex (Asgarali, 
Coombs et al. 2007). 
Clinical signs vary from acute death in the peracute form (rare); fever, anorexia, anemia, and 
lethargy in the acute form (most common): and reduced performance and weight loss in the 
chronic form. Transmission occurs through ticks as biological vectors, or through mechanical 
transmission by iatrogenic inoculation with infected blood (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996). Vertical 
transmission of T. equi also occurs in horses. Dual infections with both organisms have been 
reported and cross-immunity does not occur.  
2.2.2. Description of the Equine Population 
Currently no accurate estimate of the current total number of horses in the United States exists. 
According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, the total inventory of horses in the United States is 
4,028,827 on 575,942 farms (Figure 6). However, this census only counts horses that are on a 
farm, or places that sells $1,000 of agriculture products or has 5 or more equids (other than 
commercial enterprises such as racetracks) (USDA 2007a). 
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The United States Department of Agriculture also described U.S. equine populations in a survey 
of operations with 5 or more horses in 28 States and 4 regions representing 78 percent of all 
horses and 78.6 percent of all premises (USDA 2007a). The highest rate of household horse 
ownership was in the Mountain Region (3.2 percent of households), followed by the Central (2.6 
percent) and South Central (2.8 percent) Regions. The Pacific region was intermediate (2.1 
percent), followed by the North Central (1.4 percent) and Atlantic regions at about 1 percent. 
Small operations (5-9 animals) contained about 66 percent of the horse population, medium 
operations (10-19 horses) contained about 26 percent, and large operations (20 or more horses) 
contained about 8 percent of the total population. The horse population in the United States is 
distributed between private users such as ranches, farms, and hobby owners and commercial 
operations engaged in breeding, boarding, training, racing, and showing. By function, about 40 
percent of premises were farms or ranches, 37 percent were personal use, and the remaining 23 
percent of operations were primarily boarding and breeding facilities (NAHMS 2006) . The pet 
horse population was estimated at about 7.3 million horses housed on about 2.1 million facilities 
and households (AVMA 2007).  
Figure 6. Horse and Pony Inventory, NASS 2007 
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Equine piroplasmosis has been identified in Quarter Horse racehorses, Thoroughbred racehorses, 
and ranch horses during 2009 through November 2010. 
2.3. Vector 
Equine piroplasmosis is primarily a tick-borne disease. There are three main modes of tick-borne 
transmission of B. caballi parasites: transstadial, intrastadial, and transovarial. Tick borne-
transmission of T. equi can occur through transstadial or intrastadial mechanisms; transovarial 
transmission of T. equi in ticks is uncertain or absent. Transstadial transmission occurs when a 
tick (larval or nymphal) acquires the pathogen from an infected host in one lifecycle stage and 
then transmits it to another host in the next lifecycle stage. The pathogen is retained by the tick 
through the molting process (i.e., nymph to adult). Intrastadial transmission occurs when a tick 
acquires the pathogen and transmits to a naïve host without development or molting to another 
life stage. Transovarial transmission occurs when an infected female tick passes the pathogen to 
eggs, resulting in infected offspring (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008).  
Historically, Anocentor (Dermacentor) nitens, the tropical horse tick, was thought to be the only 
known natural vector of EP (Babesia caballi) in the United States (Roby and Anthony 1963). 
Recent evidence suggests that D. variabilis, American dog tick and Amblyomma cajennense, the 
cayenne tick, may be natural vectors of T. equi as demonstrated with the field collection of adults 
and transmission of T. equi to naïve horses (Scoles 2010).  
Rhipicephalus microplus is an experimental vector of T. equi, and evidence is growing that R. 
microplus is likely a natural vector of T. equi in subtropical and tropical regions of the Americas 
(Knowles, Kappmeyer et al. 1992; Guimarães, Lima et al. 1998; Heuchert, de Giulli Jr. et al. 
1999; Battsetseg, Lucero et al. 2002). Transstadial transmission of T. equi by R. microplus has 
been confirmed with the acquisition of parasites by the nymphal stage from chronically infected 
horses and transmitting as a newly molted adult to a naïve host (Stiller, Goff et al. 2002; Ueti, 
Palmer et al. 2005). Additionally, R. microplus males can acquire T. equi parasites from 
chronically infected horses and transmit the parasites to naïve horses through intrastadial 
transmission (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008).  
In addition to the four species of ticks that are proven or suspected to be natural EP vectors, 
Dermacentor albipictus, the winter tick, has been shown to transmit B. caballi and T. equi under 
laboratory conditions. Rhipicephalus sanguineus, brown dog tick, has been reported as a vector of 
B. caballi and T. equi, but there is no evidence that this tick species is an EP vector in the United 
States (Kouam, Kantzoura et al. 2010). A list of competent vectors with evidence for vector 
competence is located in Table 4. A map of potential vector distribution can be found in Figure 7. 
2.4. Environment 
In addition to tick borne transmission, EP pathogens may be transmitted mechanically through 
fomites contaminated with blood. Blood infected with Babesia microti, the causative agent of 
human babesiosis, may remain infective for up to 3 days at room temperature and up to 17 days 
with refrigeration (Eberhard, Walker et al. 1995). Survival of other Babesia species in blood is 
presumed to be similar to B. microti. 
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Table 4. Known natural and experimental EP tick vectors in the United States. 
 Babesia caballi Theileria equi 
Distribution  
Evidence of 
competence 
Mode of 
transmission 
Evidence of 
competence 
Mode of 
transmission 
R. microplus   Experimental Transstadial and 
Intrastadial  
Limited to southern Texas 
A. nitens Natural Transovarial 
Transstadial 
  Limited to southern Texas 
D. variabilis Experimental Transovarial  Natural and 
Experimental* 
Intrastadial  Wide distribution across the 
United States 
A. cajennense   Natural and 
Experimental*  
Intrastadial  Limited to southern Texas 
D. albipictus Experimental Transovarial    Wide distribution across the 
United States 
Adapted from (Stiller and Coan 1995; Stiller, Goff et al. 2002; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008) 
*(Scoles 2010) 
 
Figure 7. Reported distribution by State of potential equine piroplasmosis vectors in the United States. 
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3. RELEASE ASSESSMENT 
The release assessment estimates the likelihood that an EP pathogen will be released from a 
quarantined premises. The pathways for release examined were the movement of a confirmed 
positive horse and a infected undetected horse.  
3.1. Diagnosis _________________________________________________________  
To understand the likelihood of release, the accuracy of diagnostic tests must first be discussed. 
Microscopic identification of parasites in stained blood is possible; however, identification in 
chronically infected animals may be difficult due to low parasitemia. Other techniques for 
identifying the organism, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and the loop-mediated 
isothermal amplification (LAMP) can be used to detect DNA of the EP pathogens (Alhassan, 
Govind et al. 2007). These tests are not currently approved for regulatory diagnostic purposes in 
the United States.  
Several serologic tests are available for the detection of T. equi or B. caballi infections. OIE 
currently recommends the indirect florescent antibody (IFA) and enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA) for international trading purposes. However, the tests currently approved to 
classify horses in the United States include the CF and cELISA tests. These are the only tests 
evaluated in this assessment. The cELISA uses a recombinant protein and a specific monoclonal 
antibody (MAb) to identify antibody response to surface proteins on a specific lifecycle stage of 
the EP pathogens (merozoite). Antibody detection with the CF test disappears 2-3 months after 
infection in B. caballi- infected horses (Weiland 1986). The cELISA is more sensitive than CF at 
detecting chronically infected horses (Knowles, Kappmeyer et al. 1992; Kappmeyer, Perryman et 
al. 1999a).  
A description of test performance reported in the literature can be found in Appendix C. 
Performance of Diagnostic Tests Over Time.  
3.1.1. Sensitivity/specificity 
No diagnostic test is 100 percent accurate at detecting the presence or absence of disease in a 
population. The ability of a diagnostic test to correctly identify an infected animal as positive on a 
diagnostic test is referred to as sensitivity. Animals that are infected but test results indicate they 
are not infected (test negative) are referred to as false negatives or infected undetected. The 
ability of a diagnostic test to correctly identify an uninfected individual as negative is referred to 
as specificity. Animals which are not infected but tests results are positive are referred to as false 
positives.  
Reported sensitivities and specificities for serologic tests for EP are difficult to interpret due to a 
lack of a gold standard to compare with the serologic tests. For this assessment, the diagnostic 
characteristics of cELISA and CF tests for detection of T. equi and B. caballi were estimated 
using Bayesian analysis using WINBUGS version 3.0.3 software (MRC Biostatistics Unit 2007). 
Specifically, the uncertainty distributions (posterior) for the test characteristics were estimated 
from cross-testing data where the target populations were tested using both cELISA and CF. This 
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analysis only included the cELISA currently approved and licensed in the United States (VMRD 
cELISA).  
The benefits of Bayesian analysis for this application include:  
• Data from different sources can be combined to estimate the test characteristics.  
• Data with unknown characteristics, such as prevalence in the target population, can 
be utilized.    
3.1.1.1. Assumptions 
The assumptions used in this analysis included: 
• The sensitivity and specificity of the cELISA and CF tests are the same in data from 
various sources considered in the analysis. 
• The results of the cELISA and CF tests are conditionally independent, depending 
only on whether the sample is a true positive or true negative. 
• The impact of time since exposure to the parasite on cELISA and CF test 
characteristics are not considered in the current analysis. 
• The sensitivity and specificity of cELISA for detecting T. equi and B. caballi are 
greater than 50 percent. 
3.1.1.2. Model 
The distributions for the sensitivity and specificity were estimated separately for T. equi and B. 
caballi. The uncertainty distributions (posterior) for the test characteristics were estimated 
through Markov Chain Monte-Carlo sampling using WINBUGS v 3.03 software. Uniform prior 
distribution was used for most parameters. Four chains were simulated for 50,000 iterations each. 
Convergence was monitored by comparing the results across different chains.  
3.1.1.3. Data 
The data used for this analysis included: 
For T. equi 
• A comparison of CF and cELISA results with sera sequentially obtained from 4 
horses for 60 days after experimental exposure to T. equi and to B. caballi (Katz, 
Dewald et al. 2000).   
• 154 samples from 19 countries were tested for T. equi using CF and cELISA 
(Knowles, Perryman et al. 1991). 
• CFT and cELISA test results for 292 samples classified as true positives (VS reported 
outbreak data, unpublished). 
For B. caballi 
• 289 samples submitted to NVSL and tested for B. caballi using CF and cELISA 
(Kappmeyer, Perryman et al. 1999b). 
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3.1.1.4. Results 
The sensitivity of cELISA for detecting T. equi was estimated to be 96 percent (90 percent C.I. 
94-98) as shown in Table 5. A caveat in the application of these results is that sensitivity of 
cELISA could be considerably lower if there are a higher proportion of recently exposed horses 
in the target population. In addition, test variation may occur depending on the cELISA test kit 
used. According to VS Memorandum 555.20, all exposed equids must be retested at least 30 days 
from the last exposure to a positive equid. This analysis did not consider retesting of these 
animals. The sensitivity of cELISA for detecting B. caballi may be lower than for detecting T. 
equi based on the preliminary results (Table 6). The specificity of the cELISA is greater for B. 
caballi (98 percent) than T. equi (95 percent). 
There is greater uncertainty regarding the sensitivity of CF, which is 47 percent for the detection 
of T. equi and 88 percent for the detection of B. caballi. The sensitivity estimates from different 
data sources had a greater variance for this parameter.  
Table 5. Test Characteristics of CF and cELISA for detecting T. equi. 
Test Test Characteristic Mean 95 Min 95 Max 
C-ELISA Sensitivity 96% 94% 98% 
Specificity 95% 83% 99% 
CF Sensitivity  47% 42% 51% 
Specificity 94% 83% 99% 
     
Table 6 .Test characteristics of CF and cELISA for detecting B. caballi. 
Test Test Characteristic Mean 95 Min 95 Max 
C-ELISA Sensitivity  91% 85% 96% 
Specificity  70% 60% 85% 
CF Sensitivity  88% 63% 99% 
Specificity  98% 95% 99% 
3.2. Release Pathway 1: Confirmed Positive Cases 
Currently, under VS Memorandum 555.20 a confirmed positive case is any horse that has tested 
positive by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) with either a CF or cEISA test. 
A horse can be classified as a confirmed-positive case without showing evidence of clinical 
disease. (USDA 2009) Animals with positive test results on one test may not be positive on 
another test (Donnelly, Joyner et al. 1980; Tenter and Friedhoff 1986a; Heuchert, de Giulli Jr et 
al. 1999). There is no cross immunity between the two organisms (Maurer 1962; Taylor, Bryant 
et al. 1969), so infection with only one organism would not likely result in a positive test for the 
other organism. 
When an animal tests positive for EP, two possibilities exist: 1) the horse is truly infected, or 2) 
the horse is uninfected and the test result (for any number of reasons) is incorrect. In this section, 
the likelihood that a horse with a positive test result is truly infected with EP will be determined. 
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The positive predictive value of a test is the likelihood that an animal is truly infected, given a 
positive test result. In order for a confirmed positive case to release an EP pathogen off the 
premises, the horse must test positive and be infected with the organism at the time of movement.  
In order to estimate the number of confirmed positive animals that are truly infected, the positive 
predictive value was estimated based on the sensitivity and specificity described above using the 
following formula:  
Positive predictive value =  
1-[(1-SpTest1)*(1-SpTest2)*(…) / ((1-SpTest1)*(1-SpTest2)*(…)+SeTest1*SeTest2*…)] 
The positive predictive value was estimated for horses that underwent both the CF and cELISA 
tests, and horses tested with only cELISA. It is not common practice to test with CF only. From 
100 test positive animals for T equi, the mean number of animals which may be truly infected is 
76 using cELISA, and 98 when tested with both CF and cELISA. This is similar for B caballi 
(Table 7). Therefore, the likelihood that a horse with a positive test result is infected with EP is 
high. It then follows that if a confirmed positive case leaves the quarantined premises, the risk 
that it will carry the EP pathogen off the premises (release) is high (>40 percent).  
Table 7. Positive predictive value. Probability that a test positive animal is infected.  
  Mean Min (5% 
confidence) 
Max (95% 
confidence) 
cELISA only T equi 76.23% 64.05% 88.21% 
 B. caballi 77.70% 64.70% 91.02% 
cELISA and CF T equi 98.31% 93.53% 99.92% 
 B caballi 99.14% 96.51% 99.87% 
     
Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 71.3 does not currently allow for interstate 
movement of confirmed positive cases, therefore it is assumed that these horses only move 
temporarily to a race, show or other equid event as described in section 1.4.  
Some treatments for B. caballi have been considered effective at eliminating the parasites 
(Weiland 1986); however, treatment is not part of routine management of EP cases. Therefore, 
movement of confirmed positive animals after treatment was not assessed.  
The risk that a confirmed positive case is infected and releasing EP agent is high.  
3.3. Release Pathway 2: Infected Undetected Horses _________________________  
Horses are allowed to move off a quarantined premises after negative tests and acaricide 
application. When an animal tests negative for EP, one of two possibilities exist: 1) the animal is 
truly uninfected or 2) the animal is infected but the test fails to detect the infection. It is this later 
population, referred to as infected undetected horses, which can move EP pathogens off the 
premises.  
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The likelihood that a test will fail to detect a truly infected animal is the complement of the test 
sensitivity (1-Se). If multiple tests are used, then a failure to detect occurs only if all tests fail to 
detect the pathogen ((1-SeTestA)*(1-SeTestB)*…)). The sensitivity and specificity of the CF and 
cELISA tests were determined by the analysis described in section 3.1.1. 
Diagnostic test performance can vary by animal and situation, therefore a single probability of 
detection cannot be applied to a test. Instead, a probability distribution is used to address these 
potential situational variations. These results were then fit into beta distributions using a risk 
analysis software program @RISK (Palisade 2009) in order to reflect the uncertainty about the 
true, but unknown values of these tests as applied in the field. The beta distributions for this 
analysis can be found in Appendix B. Beta Distributions.  
According to VS Memorandum 555.20, a horse is considered to be infected with EP if it tests 
positive on either the CF or cELISA tests. A commonly used protocol is to test with CF and 
cELISA in parallel; therefore, a horse would be considered uninfected only if it tested negative on 
both tests. The probability of nondetection using this parallel testing approach was evaluated. The 
other common scenario is testing with cELISA alone and considering a test negative animal not 
infected. Thus, the probability of nondetection describes the likelihood that an infected horse will 
test negative in either scenario. As noted above, there is uncertainty about the test sensitivity, so 
there will be uncertainty about the nondetection probabilities as well. For example, the mean 
probability of not detecting an infected horse using both tests for B. caballi is 0.88 percent. The 
probability of an infected horse testing negative is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Probability of nondetection, CF and cELISA. 
Percentiles B. caballi T. equi 
5th 0.12% 0.03% 
50th 0.88% 0.09% 
95th 3.06% 0.26% 
If a single test is used (cELISA) the nondetection probabilities increase, shown in Table 9 (must 
test positive to both tests). 
Table 9. Probability of nondetection, cELISA only. 
Percentiles B. caballi T. equi 
5th 4.57% 1.26% 
50th 8.43% 3.40% 
95th 13.80% 7.10% 
The probabilities calculated above can also be used to estimate the number of infected horses that 
test negative for EP, given that 1,000 infected horses are tested. This is calculated by using a 
binomial distribution. A binomial distribution estimates the number of successes (infected 
nondetected horses) in a population (1,000 infected horses) given a probability (the probability on 
nondetection). 
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If both the cELISA and CF tests are used the horses must test negative to both. Therefore, the 
number of truly infected horses that would test negative would be:  
• B. caballi: 9 (median), 32 (upper 95 percent), 1 (lower 5 percent) 
• T. equi: 1 (median), 4 (upper 95 percent), 0 (lower 5 percent) 
If only the cELISA test is used: 
• B. caballi: 84 (median), 140 (upper 95 percent), 44 (lower 5 percent) 
• T. equi: 34 (median), 73 (upper 95 percent), 11 (lower 5 percent) 
The risk of a negative exposed horse being infected undetected and allowing the release of the 
pathogen off a quarantined premises is low (< 1 percent) when testing with cELISA and CF, and 
moderate (1.4 percent) for B. caballi with cELISA only.  
3.4. Overall Likelihood of Release _________________________________________  
The risk of release is the likelihood that the movement of the pathway off a quarantined premises 
will result in the successful release of B. caballi or T. equi from the premises. Horses that test 
positive for either EP pathogen are a high-risk pathway for release, while infected undetected 
horses pose a low risk of being infected and therefore moving an EP pathogen off a quarantined 
premises (exception in B. caballi infected horses that are tested with cELISA only and pose a 
moderate risk).  
Table 10. Risk of release pathway. 
 B. caballi T. equi 
Release pathways Risk Uncertainty Risk Uncertainty 
Test positive case- cELISA only High Low High Low 
Test positive case- cELISA and CF High Low High Low 
Infected undetected- cELISA only Moderate  Low Low  Low 
Infected undetected- cELISA and CF Low Low Low Low 
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4. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT 
The exposure assessment estimates the likelihood of exposure and the risk of transmission if an 
uninfected horse is exposed to the EP pathogen by: ticks, vertical transmission, or iatrogenic 
transmission of blood or blood components.  
4.1. Likelihood of Exposure to Release Pathway _____________________________  
The likelihood an uninfected horse exposed to an EP pathogen by the interstate movement of a 
horse off a quarantined premises is based on the generalized practices in the equine industry and 
the mitigation measures discussed in section 1.4. The practices of specific sector and State 
requirements will also be discussed. 
4.1.1. General Biosecurity Practices 
Biosecurity practices are variable throughout the equine industry. A recent study conducted by 
USDA:APHIS:VS asked producers to report on common practices. General equine industry 
biosecurity and biocontainment practices reported include isolation, infection control, and 
equipment disinfection (USDA 2007b). Management practices also included limiting contact 
between animals, insect control, manure management, and preventing feed contamination. 
Insect control was reported on 88.9 percent of operations. Control measures included repellents, 
reducing vegetation, emptying and refilling water containers, using facemasks on the horses, and 
applying insecticides in housing areas. Some insect control measures could also be effective 
against ticks.  
Overall, about 65 percent of operations isolated equids for infection control. The most common 
requirements were Coggins tests (45.3 percent), vaccination (36.3 percent), and worming (33.6 
percent). Larger operations (20 or more horses) were most likely to require isolation followed by 
medium (10-19 horses) and small operations(5-9 horses). Health evaluation and quarantine were 
often practiced when new nonresident animals entered existing facilities. Quarantine prior to 
contact was not often required and where resident horses departed and returned to a facility, 60.6 
percent of operations did not conduct reentry quarantine. Only 2.8 percent of operations routinely 
quarantined returning resident horses.  
The American Association of Equine Practitioners (AAEP 2006) has published biosecurity 
information, recommendations, and guidelines for equine practitioners (AAEP 2006). The AAEP 
recommends multi-language instructions and that a specific individual care for an affected horse. 
They also recommend restricted facility access and segregation of sick animals. The guidelines 
further recommend that tack be horse-specific and shared equipment be thoroughly sanitized. 
Facilities should be constructed of nonporous material, which should be periodically and 
thoroughly disinfected. While many of these biosecurity practices may help reduce the risk of tick 
exposure between horses, they have little impact on the iatrogenic routes of EP transmission.  
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4.1.2. Industry and State Specific Requirements 
While biosecurity and management practices are not well described for the equine industry, it is 
recognized that some practices may be more common in various sectors. In addition, 
management, testing, and movement requirements vary by State, which could impact risk. The 
management of an infected horse by status (known positive or infected undetected) also has an 
impact.  
The current Veterinary Services memorandum restates that 9 CFR 71.3 prohibits interstate, but 
does not restrict intrastate, movement of EP positive horses. Many individual States have not 
formulated or universally applied EP specific quarantine and movement regulations. Examination 
of a list of State movement requirements (U.S.Rider 2010) shows that only 6 of the 50 States 
have equine movement regulations which specifically address EP. Some States deny entry to 
horses from Texas, some deny entry of horses from “infected premises” or state that “no horse 
that has ever tested positive” for EP may enter the State. Constantly changing State requirements 
indicate that Web sites may not always reflect the latest movement regulations; therefore, State 
specific mitigations were not considered in this assessment.  
An exhaustive review of equine health management at events was last performed in 2005 
(NAHMS 2006), before the current outbreaks of EP in Texas, Florida, and Missouri. The study 
presented in 2005 remains the best available data and contains information, which can be used to 
estimate relative risk of transmission of EP at certain events or under known conditions. In a few 
cases, it can be determined that horses must be CF or cELISA negative for EP to participate in an 
event, but there remains substantial possibility that events can and will occur, in which the EP 
status of the participating horses is unknown.  
In 2005, 57.1 percent of all events examined did not require a CVI for horses attending an event. 
National events, in general, were more likely than Regional or State events to require a CVI or 
Health Certificate. However, the presence of a CVI does not indicate the animals were tested for 
EP; therefore, has little impact on the potential for EP spread but does indicate physical 
examination by a veterinarian. A site veterinarian was present at 22.8 percent of all events but an 
apparently healthy animal would remain undetected on clinical exam. 
Insect control (ticks not addressed) was not performed at 49.5 percent of the events studied.  
The following table estimates relative risk of EP transmission for the five industry sectors using 
the likelihood of tick presence, most likely release pathway, length of direct contact with other 
horses, most likely exposure pathway, and likelihood of exposure (based on biosecurity).  
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Table 11. Summary of risk by sector. 
 
Purchased additions 
to small operations 
Show 
horses 
Trail and 
ranch horses 
Sanctioned 
racetrack 
Unsanctioned 
racetrack 
Likelihood of tick 
present in 
environment  
Moderate- climate 
dependant 
Low High Low Moderate 
Length of direct 
contact with other 
horses 
Long Short Long Short Short to 
unknown 
Most likely release 
pathway 
Infected undetected Confirmed 
positive 
horses or 
infected 
undetected 
Infected 
undetected 
Confirmed 
positive 
horses or 
infected 
undetected 
Infected 
undetected 
Most likely exposure 
pathway 
Vectors, iatrogenic Iatrogenic  Vectors, 
iatrogenic 
All unlikely Iatrogenic 
Likelihood of 
exposure (based on 
biosecurity) 
High Low High Low High 
4.1.3. Exposure to Confirmed Positive Horses 
Based on characteristics of tests for EP, a confirmed positive horse that was allowed to leave a 
quarantined premises has a high likelihood of actually being infected and thus causing release of 
the EP pathogen. However, the limitations on movement and use of these horses assumed in this 
assessment serve to limit exposure of uninfected horses to EP pathogens via any of the iatrogenic 
exposure pathways examined. Acaricides applied prior to movement off the quarantined premises 
would reduce the risk of an infected tick attached and the continued application of acaricide 
would reduce the risk of ticks feeding on these horses. These horses are allowed to breed which 
puts foals at an increased risk of exposure to T. equi. Because these horses are only allowed to 
move temporarily under a permit issued by the State and identified, it is unlikely these horses 
would be lost in the interstate movement process. Restricted movement of horses decreases the 
likelihood that an infected horse will be a source of infection for ticks in other locations. 
However, unpublished reports indicate that confirmed positive horses have bypassed monitoring 
requirements when owners are unwilling to cooperate.  
4.1.4. Exposure to Infected Undetected Horses 
Based on the characteristics of EP tests when used in accordance with VS Memorandum 555.20, 
a test-negative horse has a low likelihood of being infected undetected with EP and thus allowing 
an EP pathogens to be released from the quarantined premises. However, if an animal is infected 
undetected, it could leave a quarantined premises with unrestricted movement, no identification, 
and no additional testing. These horses are likely to have a great deal of contact with naïve horses 
in other locations and it is unknown how frequently blood doping, equipment sharing, or other 
high-risk practices occur. In addition, lack of acaricide treatment, once this population has 
permanently left the quarantined premises, would allow for exposure to ticks in the environment. 
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The acaricide application prior to movement would reduce the risk of a tick attached at the time 
of movement. No breeding restrictions are identified therefore any foal born to infected 
undetected mares are at high risk of exposure to EP pathogens.  
4.2. Exposure Pathway 1: Ticks ___________________________________________  
Ticks may be responsible for EP transmission to an uninfected horse through two scenarios:  
1) An infected tick introduced by horse movement off a quarantined premises would have to 
feed directly on an uninfected horse on the new premises while infected.  
2) A tick on the new premises would need to feed on an infected horse introduced and feed 
on an uninfected horse while still maintaining infection.  
4.2.1. Infected Tick Attached to Horse Moving Off a Quarantined Premises 
In order for an infected tick to move off a quarantined premises, the tick must first become 
infected with the EP pathogen on that premises and survive acaricide treatment prior to its arrival 
onto the new premises. VS Memorandum 555.20 contains several mitigations designed to prevent 
ticks from moving off a quarantined premises. Ticks may move off a premises by other 
mechanism, but only horse movement was considered in this assessment. 
Horses leaving a quarantined facility must be treated with an acaricide not less than 24 hours or 
more than 14 days prior to movement. Chemical control methods are effective in reducing host 
exposure to ticks, especially when appropriate chemicals are applied at times and locations that 
will have the greatest impact on the developmental stages of the ticks. When spraying a horse 
with an acaricide, all skin surfaces should be wetted, including the undercarriage. Acaricide 
should be wiped onto the surfaces of the pinna and false nostril. Dipping is the optimal method 
for applying acaricides, as this method ensures that all skin surfaces are wetted; however, 
spraying is acceptable when dipping is not practical (VS Memorandum 556.1). 
A laboratory study compared 17 formulations of 15 acaricides on 7 species of engorged female 
ticks (Drummond and Ossorio 1988). Effectiveness was measured as a reduction in the number of 
eggs produced per engorged female after exposure to a candidate acaricide. The most effective 
acaricides were chlorfenvinphos, lindane, chlorphyrifos, coumaphos, diazinon, permethrin, 
phosmet, amitraz, dioxathion, arsenic trioxide, malathion, tetrachlorvinphos, carbaryl, toxaphen, 
and ronnel. Tick species tested included A. cajennense, A. nitens, B. annulatus, and B. microplus. 
With the exceptions of permethrin and coumaphos, these compounds demonstrated toxicity to 
ticks; however, most of these compounds do not meet EPA requirements for low human health 
risk, rapid environmental degradation, and low ecological toxicity to nontarget organisms which 
means they cannot be registered for use in the United States (EPA 2007; EPA 2008).  
Problems of acaricide resistance in ticks (as a result of prolonged use), animal product 
contamination, and environmental residues may render acaricide treatments ineffective over time 
as a control method. Levels of tick infestation are usually decreased through the alternate use of 
chemical acaricides on animals and in the environment, while considering the seasonal dynamics 
of ticks (Jongejan and Uilenberg 1994). An integrated pest management (IPM) approach, as 
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discussed in VS Memorandum 555.20 should be considered for tick control and to minimize 
exposure to ticks in view of the increased acaricide resistance in ticks on global basis.  
The likelihood of a tick carrying an EP pathogen off a premises and infecting a new horse is low 
in most cases, however, the efficacy of acaricides should be monitored during prolonged usage. 
The uncertainty around this is high due to the lack of understanding of resistance of some tick 
species to acaricides over time, conflicting information on the topic, and possibility of incorrect 
application.  
4.2.2. Ticks in the Environment 
In order for a tick in the environment to transmit EP, an infected horse would need to be 
introduced to the premises, the tick would need to feed on the infected horse, and be capable of 
transmitting the organism during subsequent feeding. For many tick borne diseases including EP, 
the presence of the tick is not sufficient for an infection to occur. The major components involved 
in the occurrence of a vector borne disease include: the abundance of vectors and reservoir hosts, 
prevalence of pathogens within vectors and vertebrate hosts, local environment conditions 
particularly temperature and moisture for tick vectors, and host resistance in the targeted host 
population (Kitron and Kazmierczak 1997). Transmission of most tick-borne diseases is seasonal 
because many tick species seek hosts during a well-defined period of the year. These time periods 
or seasonal activities are when ticks can transmit diseases and when vertebrate hosts are most 
likely at risk (Estrada-Peña 2008). 
Wildlife and pet animals such as cats and dogs can serve as hosts for multiple stages of ticks, 
potentially increasing equine exposure to ticks. Contact with nonequine animals was reported on 
many operations. Dogs (76.9 percent of operations) and cats (66.4 percent of operations) were the 
most common contact, but cattle (43.2 percent of operations), poultry (18.6 percent of operations) 
and skunks-raccoons-opossums-bats (25-50 percent) were also present (NAHMS 2006). 
However, these species are not considered to be reservoir hosts for EP.  
The prevalence of infection in host-seeking ticks depends directly on the frequency of encounters 
between ticks and reservoir hosts, which, in this case, are horses infected with EP pathogens. 
Moreover, the risk of infection for hosts depends on the number of infected questing ticks and of 
the number of hosts in an area. As the number of tick bites per host increases, the probability of 
transmission increases, resulting in higher prevalence of infection in the host population. The 
frequency of tick encounters with horses is affected by the behavior of individual ticks and 
horses.  
The longer the host is infected with a pathogen the greater the opportunity for transmission to 
take place and less likely that the tick’s seasonal activities will influence the maintenance of 
enzootic cycles. B. caballi has a relative shorter infective period in horses than T. equi, where the 
horse maintains lifelong infections (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008). The 
lifelong nature of T. equi infection in horses provides a continual source for pathogen acquisition 
by ticks, which is required by each tick generation as the T. equi infection cannot be maintained 
by the tick alone. Ueti et al. (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005) indicated that the threshold level for 
nymphal R. microplus to acquire T. equi and have development progression of the pathogen to the 
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salivary glands after molting to an adult was less than 105.8 B. equi parasites per milliliter of horse 
blood. There was no difference in the percentage of adult ticks that developed infection in the 
salivary glands whether they fed on a horse in the acute phase (109.4/ml) versus the chronic phase 
(105.8 to 106 /ml). This is consistent with other blood-borne pathogens. Once the threshold level is 
reached a further increase does not result in a larger percentage of ticks being infected. The exact 
number of ticks needed to transmit T. equi to horses is unknown. There is evidence to suggest that 
fewer than 10 ticks are needed to transmit the pathogen to a naïve horse. A study examined the 
salivary glands of fed ticks with T. equi in their salivary glands at the time of transmission. The 
minimal number of ticks with detectable T. equi in the salivary gland at the time of successful 
transmission feeding varied from 4- to 10-ticks per horse (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005). Therefore, it 
appears that only a few infected ticks are required for the successful transmission of T. equi to 
horses in a laboratory setting. Other possible influences on successful tick transmission are the 
number of sporozoites in the tick salivary gland, pathogen, and tick strain differences, and the 
duration of the tick feeding in the field and those that require further investigation. 
Although Anocentor nitens, the tropical horse tick, is a natural vector of EP caused by B. caballi, 
it may not be an important vector in the United States because of its limited distributional range 
within southern Florida and Texas. Anocentor nitens is unable to maintain EP infections by 
transovarial transmission for more than a few generations and may only be successful as a short-
term reservoir (Schwint, Knowles et al. 2008b). On the other hand, D. albipictus and D. variabilis 
may be important vectors because they experimentally transovarially transmit B. caballi, 
naturally infest horses, and are widely distributed throughout the United States. Rhipicepalus 
microplus transtadially transmits T. equi and can be found on horses particularly if horses are kept 
with cattle. Rhipicepalus microplus is distributed throughout southern Texas and is being 
controlled through USDA’s cattle fever tick program. Despite the wide distributions of D. 
albipictus and D. variabilis in the United States and the presence of EP infected horses, it is 
unclear why EP has not become well established in these tick populations. It may be that the 
frequency of contact between these tick species and horses are below the threshold to maintain or 
spread EP. The lack of contact may be related to the host preferences of the immature stages of 
these tick species (i.e., the American dog tick is frequently found on rodents), varying seasonal 
activities of the each of the tick life stages, tick density, and animal husbandry management 
practices, and low prevalence of EP in the United States. Moreover, both the level of tick 
susceptibility to EP infection and the likelihood of tick-mediated transmission to a horse will vary 
with tick and EP pathogen strain (Stiller and Coan, 1995). 
The outbreak in Texas involved transmission by ticks, but tick mediated spread has not been 
confirmed for other outbreaks in the United States. The ranch appears to be a suitable habitat for 
the maintenance of large numbers of competent tick vectors (high vector density) and large 
numbers of horses and cattle (high host density). In addition, the common animal management 
practice of mixing horses with cattle and working horse activities (find strays in a tick habitat) 
create an environment of high frequency of contact between the tick vectors and hosts. It is 
possible that this situation could occur if T. equi were introduced onto another premises with 
similar environment conditions and management practices. The tick populations alone cannot 
sustain the EP pathogen as they are not reservoirs of the pathogen. Anocentor nitens, can only 
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maintain B. caballi through one generation with no reservoir host present therefore the risk of B. 
caballi establishment may be lower than T. equi.  
Based on this scenario the risk of transmission from ticks in the environment, given an infected 
horse enters the premises, is low assuming acaricides still maintain efficacy. However, the risk 
may vary by environmental factors and vector competency. The uncertainty around this is high 
due to the limited information available on EP transmission and density of vectors in the United 
States. The appropriate density of infected horses, competent vectors, and environmental 
conditions for the tick to survive and move through its lifecycle would be needed for EP to 
persist, or the tick would need to feed directly on an uninfected horse during the same life stage. 
Therefore, a tick can only become infected, and the infection maintained in a tick population, 
with the presence of an infected host.  
4.3. Exposure Pathway 2: Vertical Transmission ____________________________  
In order for vertical transmission to cause spread of T .equi on a new premises as defined in this 
assessment, the introduced horse would have to be a T. equi infected, test-negative mare that 
subsequently gives birth on a new premises. 
Transmission of T. equi from infected mares to their offspring in utero has been described (Phipps 
and Otter 2004; Allsopp, Lewis et al. 2007). A short report from 2004 described two horses in the 
United Kingdom born to a carrier mare imported from Portugal, where T. equi is endemic. The 
horses were 2- and 5- years old when infection was detected on CF and IFAT. Organisms were 
also detected on blood smears. An epidemiological investigation led to the conclusion that the 
most likely route of transmission was transplacental (Phipps and Otter 2004). Piroplasmosis due 
to T. equi is a common cause of equine abortion. In addition, in utero infection of a fetus with T. 
equi can also result in the birth of foals with neonatal piroplasmosis or clinically normal carrier 
foals (Erbsloh 1975; de Waal and van Heerden 2004; Phipps and Otter 2004; Allsopp, Lewis et 
al. 2007; Rothschild and Knowles 2007).  
In 2007, a study on transplacental transmission of T. equi in a group of 17 chronically infected 
mares concluded that T. equi transmission from mother to fetus occurs across the normal placenta 
and can occur as early as the first trimester of pregnancy (Allsopp, Lewis et al. 2007). The 
authors were able to detect T. equi organisms via DNA probe in artificially aborted fetus as early 
as 130 days gestation. In addition, the study results indicated that congenital infection of foals 
born to T. equi carrier mares is common: In the study, six T. equi carrier mares were allowed to 
carry foals to full term, and all foals were born clinically normal but T. equi probe positive. The 
samples were collected 12 hours after birth, and the foals were kept in a tick-free experimental 
barn, making tick-mediated transmission unlikely. The authors concluded that if a T. equi carrier 
mare gives birth, the resultant foal would likely be infected with T. equi.  
A recent case report described a foal in Trinidad that was born weak and severely icteric with 
hematuria. A blood smear at 10 hours postpartum revealed that 63 percent of the foal’s red blood 
cells were parasitized, and reverse line blot and nested PCR identified T. equi. The mare was 
clinically healthy and a blood smear and reverse line blot were both T. equi negative. (These are 
different from the standard tests approved by VS; therefore, Se/Sp for these tests has not been 
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described in this document.) Nested PCR performed on the mare’s blood was T. equi positive. 
The authors concluded that this case demonstrated that carrier mares could transmit T. equi to 
their foals. However, based on the data in the case report, it is impossible to determine at which 
point during pregnancy or parturition T. equi transmission occurred (Georges, Ezeokoli et al. 
2010). 
In contrast, another recent study failed to amplify T. equi DNA in 6 neonatal foals born to 
chronically infected dams (3 horses, 3 donkeys) and concluded that transplacental transmission 
did not occur in this group of animals (Kumar, Kumar et al. 2008). The authors argued that the 
normal equine placenta should serve as a barrier to molecules as large as T. equi. The conflicting 
results could be due to T. equi strain behavior, differences in host immunity, and differences in 
test performance, or study design.  
In the recent T. equi outbreak in Texas, there is evidence that vertical transmission, at least of that 
specific strain of T. equi, is inefficient (Knowles 2010). Of the 24 mares that foaled, all 24 foals 
were PCR negative at birth (USDA unpublished).  
There is sufficient evidence of transplacental transmission to conclude that there is moderate risk 
that the foal of a T. equi infected mare will be born infected. However, due to conflicting 
evidence, the uncertainty surrounding this estimate is medium.  
No evidence of vertical transmission of B. caballi resulting in infected foals was found, thus the 
risk that a foal born to a mare infected with B. caballi will be infected is negligible, and the 
uncertainty surrounding this estimate is medium. 
4.4. Exposure Pathway 3: Iatrogenic via Blood or Blood Components___________  
Horse blood is a documented source of B. caballi and T. equi infection (Sippel, Cooperrider et al. 
1962; Ristic, Oppermann et al. 1964; Sibinovic, Ristic et al. 1965; Holbrook and Frerichs 1968; 
Holbrook 1969; Hurcombe, Mudge et al. 2007; CFSPH 2008). Purely mechanical transmission of 
EP was confirmed in a herd of British horses (Gerstenberg, Allen et al. 1999). Experimentally, 
both organisms have been transmitted by direct blood inoculation (Tenter and Friedhoff 1986b; 
Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008; Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009). 
Transfer of blood and products could occur via direct, purposeful administration of blood (or 
blood product) to a horse, or via blood contaminated fomites. The likelihood that blood, a blood 
product, or a contaminated fomite will transmit EP is affected by the number of organisms in the 
blood, the survivability of the pathogens, and the infectious dose. 
4.4.1. Infection risk from blood 
4.4.1.1. Number of Organism in Blood of an Infected Horse 
In naturally infected horses, B. caballi parasitemia is frequently as low as 0.1 percent, even in 
acute cases (de Waal 1992; Heim, Passos et al. 2007). The highest reported parasitemia is 10 
percent (Holbrook 1969; Rothschild and Knowles 2007). Horses in the chronic, subclinical phase 
of infection have parasite concentrations of less than 105 parasites per milliliter of blood 
(Holman, Frerichs et al. 1993; Schwint, Knowles et al. 2008a; Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009).  
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Parasitemias in natural T. equi infections typically range from 1 to 10 percent (de Waal 1992; 
Friedhoff and Soulé 1996). Chronically infected, subclinical horses may have extremely low 
circulating parasitemias (Maurer 1962). Parasitemias as low as 0.1 percent have been reported in 
naturally infected, subclinical horses (Heim, Passos et al. 2007). However, in some cases 
parasitemias can exceed 20 percent, and the highest reported parasitemia is 95 percent (Holbrook 
1969; de Waal 1992; Rothschild and Knowles 2007). Experimentally, horses with chronic 
infection (15- to 40-months duration) showed parasite levels which fluctuated from 103 to 106 
parasites per milliliter of blood (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008). Parasite levels 
within an individual horse fluctuated over time. With both B. caballi and T. equi infection, 
animals with the higher levels of parasitemia were clinically ill or moribund. 
Equine piroplasmosis pathogens exist in the merozoite life stage in red blood cells. Cells infected 
with B. caballi and T. equi typically have 2 or 4 merozoites per infected red cell, respectively. 
Additionally, in T. equi infections, the sporozoite life stage transmitted from a tick bite initially 
infects lymphocytes, which can contain up to 200 merozoites prior to rupturing and infecting new 
red blood cells (Rothschild and Knowles 2007). No data is available on the percentage of 
lymphocytes that would potentially be infected, or the length of time that a horse would be 
expected to have infected lymphocytes following tick-mediated transmission. 
The reference range for red blood cells in hot- and cold-blooded breeds is 8.2-12.2x1012 cells/L, 
and 5.5-9.5x1012 cells/liter, respectively (Lording 2008). Table 12 shows the potential number of 
infected red cells per milliliter of blood across horses with a variety of red blood cell concentrations 
and parasitemias As the table shows, even a horse with an extreme anemia (2x109 red blood 
cells/ml), and a very low parasitemia (0.05 percent), can have 5x105 infected cells per milliliter. 
Table 12. Infected red blood cells per milliliter. 
RBC’s/ml 
(x109) 
Number infected RBC’s per ml 
Parasitemia (%) 
0.05 0.1 1 5 10 
1 5.0x105 1.0x106 1.0x107 5.0x107 1.0x108 
2 1.0x106 2.0x106 2.0x107 1.0x108 2.0x108 
3 1.5x106 3.0x106 3.0x107 1.5x108 3.0x108 
4 2.0x106 4.0x106 4.0x107 2.0x108 4.0x108 
5 2.5x106 5.0x106 5.0x107 2.5x108 5.0x108 
6 3.0x106 6.0x106 6.0x107 3.0x108 6.0x108 
7 3.5x106 7.0x106 7.0x107 3.5x108 7.0x108 
8 4.0x106 8.0x106 8.0x107 4.0x108 8.0x108 
9 4.5x106 9.0x106 9.0x107 4.5x108 9.0x108 
10 5.0x106 1.0x107 1.0x108 5.0x108 1.0x109 
11 5.5x106 1.1x107 1.1x108 5.5x108 1.1x109 
12 6.0x106 1.2x107 1.2x108 6.0x108 1.2x109 
13 6.5x106 1.3x107 1.3x108 6.5x108 1.3x109 
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4.4.1.2. Ability of EP Pathogens to Survive 
Little conclusive information is available regarding the duration and levels of B. caballi or T. equi 
infectivity in horse blood or blood products outside of the host. Babesia caballi has been reported 
to remain infective in horse blood during cryopreservation (Holman, Frerichs et al. 1993). Little 
information regarding the ability of the EP pathogens to survive in blood ex vivo is available. 
However, a body of published work exists concerning Babesia microti, a related organism with a 
similar life history and characteristics (Homer, Aguilar-Delfin et al. 2000; Uilenberg 2006). 
Blood from hamsters experimentally infected with B. microti was able to infect naïve hamsters 
for up to 3 days if stored at room temperature, and for up to 21 days if refrigerated under 
conditions similar to those in a human blood bank. The blood used in this experiment was treated 
with EDTA to prevent coagulation (Eberhard, Walker et al. 1995). Transfusions of red blood 
cells, deglycerolized red blood cells, and platelets have transmitted B. microti to humans. In order 
for this transmission to occur, the pathogens survived common blood bank procedures including 
refrigeration, removal of white blood cells, filtration, and freezing. It is thought that Babesia sp. 
can survive freezing because the glycerol added during the process prevents red blood cell lysis 
(Gubernot, Lucey et al. 2009). EP pathogen spread via blood contaminated fomites has been 
documented, indicating that the EP pathogens can survive in blood ex vivo for at least some 
period of time. 
4.4.1.3. Infectious Dose 
A definitive infectious dose of either EP pathogen was not found. Experimentally, inoculation of 
105.2 organisms into naïve horses resulted in B. caballi infection, but the authors were not 
specifically attempting to determine infectious dose (Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009). Infectious dose of 
B. bovis for calves is less than 100 organisms (Goff, Johnson et al. 1998). Schwint et al., used 
those findings to conclude that the infectious dose for babesial organisms in general is less than 
100 organisms (Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009).  
4.4.2. Administration of Blood or Blood Components from a Known Donor 
In this portion of the assessment, the term “known donor” is used because it is assumed that the 
team performing a blood transfusion also removes the blood from the donor horse, rather than 
purchasing the blood from a licensed source (covered in section 4.4.4). Thus, the medical team 
knows the identity of the horse being used as a blood donor. 
This section discusses situations during which blood or blood components are collected from a 
known donor and are administered to a horse under the direction of a veterinarian for the 
purposes of correcting a medical problem. For the purposes of this risk assessment, this process 
will be referred to as transfusion. In order for an EP infected horse to spread EP under this 
scenario, the infected horse would need to be used as a donor for a transfusion (use of 
contaminated needles or transfusion equipment is covered in section 4.4.5). 
The most common substance used in equine transfusions is whole blood, which consists of blood 
from a donor without components removed or separated. Stored whole blood is still not widely or 
readily available in equine practice, and its use is still relatively expensive (David 2009). Within 
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the context of a veterinary client patient relationship, veterinarians can legally administer 
unlicensed blood and blood products, including keeping a donor horse at their practice (Kaler, 
Curry-Galvin et al. 2006; Evans 2010). Thus, the majority of whole blood transfused into horses 
in veterinary practice is collected by the veterinarian performing the transfusion from a known 
donor horse (Slovis and Murray 2001; David 2009) It is recommended that whole blood be used 
within 24 hours of collection. Many equine blood donors are pre-identified as donors and are 
typically housed at a veterinary practice or privately owned location by a client of the practice 
(David 2009). In emergency situations, however, veterinary tests and the AAEP transfusion 
guidelines describe the appropriate use of a horse that has not been pre-screened as a donor. 
Quarterhorses, standardbreds, and Morgans have a low prevalence of genes coding for highly 
immunogenic equine alloantigens, and thus are preferred blood donor horses (Slovis and Murray 
2001; David 2009). 
Standard guidelines for infectious disease screening of equine blood donors were not found. 
Published articles, including the American Association of Equine Practitioners’ conference 
proceedings, recommend that the donor should be generally healthy and free of infectious 
disease. In the literature published in the United States, a test for Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) 
is the only infectious disease screening specifically mentioned (Gonzales 2001). Several available 
equine medicine textbooks were reviewed, and piroplasmosis testing for blood donor horses was 
not specifically suggested (Corley and Stephen 2008; Muir and Hubbell 2008; David 2009; Reed, 
Bayley et al. 2009). More recently, APHIS published a factsheet that recommended that all horses 
being considered for use as blood donors be tested for EP (USDA 2010b). Heightened awareness 
of EP will likely lead to increased testing, but it is unclear at this time the proportion of equine 
blood donors that are being tested for piroplasmosis. 
Blood from a known donor in a medical setting could potentially be separated into its component 
parts, for example plasma, or concentrated red cells. The level of contamination of plasma with 
red or white blood cells depends on the method used to separate the plasma, though plasma 
produced in a hospital setting is likely to have cell contamination (see section 4.4.1). 
Blood donation is a relatively uncommon procedure and any one individual horse has a low 
likelihood of being chosen as a donor. For this assessment, it is assumed that a confirmed positive 
case would be moving off the quarantined premises temporarily, would be identified, would have 
location and transportation monitored, and would not be allowed to donate blood. A horse with a 
history of residency on an EP affected premises but tested negative would be unlikely to be 
chosen if its history is known. However, negative horses are not required to be tracked or 
retested. Testing for EP is becoming more common but not standard across the industry, therefore 
an apparently healthy EP infected donor would be as likely as any other horse to be used as a 
donor.  
As described in the hazard identification, T. equi and B. caballi are intraerthrocytic parasites. A 
critically ill horse may receive up to 10 liters of blood in a single transfusion (Slovis and Murray 
2001; David 2009). Thus, even a donor with low parasitemia would transmit a large number of 
organisms to the recipient. In addition, horses receiving blood in a medical situation are generally 
severely compromised. Therefore, the likelihood of transmission of either EP pathogen, when an 
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infected donor is used, is high. Because the transmissibility of the organism through small 
amounts of blood is well documented, the uncertainty surrounding this conclusion is low. 
4.4.3. Blood Doping 
Blood doping, the administration of large volumes of blood or concentrated red blood cells from a 
donor horse prior to racing, was reported as one of the practices used by those involved in bush 
track Quarter Horse racing in Florida (Holt 2008). Other names for this practice are blood 
boosting or blood packing.  
The frequency of “blood doping” in the equine industry is unknown. It is unlikely that the donors 
would be screened for EP or other diseases. Anecdotally, this practice is prevalent in the 
unsanctioned racing segment of the industry. Unpublished epidemiology reports from Florida and 
Missouri indicate that unsanitary management practices such blood doping and sharing needles or 
syringes between horses are the most likely cause of transmission of EP on premises where 
competent natural vectors do not exist.  
APHIS published an information sheet targeted at horse owners and trainers in 2010 (USDA 
2010b) This sheet recommended testing all blood donor horses for EP. However, it is unlikely 
that this practice has become commonplace among individuals who perform blood doping. 
As with medical transfusion (above) a large volume of blood or blood product is given to the 
recipient. Therefore, if a donor is infected, the risk of transmission is high. The uncertainty 
surrounding this estimate is low. 
4.4.4. Commercial Plasma and Serum Products 
Equine plasma and serum products are used to treat a variety of equine diseases, such as failure of 
passive transfer, septicemia, clotting disorders, and certain infectious diseases. Plasma is also 
administered in some cases of acute blood loss to expand blood volume and replace lost proteins 
and clotting factors. Under the conditions of this assessment, the introduced positive horse would 
need to be the donor of this plasma or serum in order for risk to occur. A literature review 
revealed no cases of commercially available horse blood or blood products serving as sources of 
B. caballi or T. equi infection. 
Plasma and serum are produced by various methods of removing red and white blood cells from 
whole blood. Plasma contains clotting factors, while serum does not. Blood cell contamination 
(red or white) can lead to adverse reactions in the recipient, and cell degradation during storage 
decreases plasma quality (Feige, Ehrat et al. 2003). Thus, it is beneficial to create serum/plasma 
products with as few cells as possible. Techniques to separate plasma from blood cells include 
gravity sedimentation, centrifugation, plasmapheresis (applicable to plasma only) (Feige, Ehrat et 
al. 2003; Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 2006). Plasma prepared by plasmapheresis has fewer red and 
white blood cells than plasma prepared by gravity sedimentation or centrifugation (Feige, Ehrat et 
al. 2003). The results are summarized in Table 13. 
The differences between the three speeds of plasmapheresis were not statistically significant, 
while the differences between the three methods were statistically significant. 
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Table 13. Absolute counts of erythrocytes and leukocytes per milliliter, by plasma preparation 
method.  
 Median cells per microliter (range) 
Production Method Erythrocytes Leucocytes 
Plasmapheresis (70 ml/min) 0.0 (0.0-2.5) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 
Plasmapheresis (85ml/min) 1.3 (0.0-5.0) 0.0(0.0-5.0) 
Plasmapheresis (100 ml/min) 2.5 (0.0-22.5) 0.0 (0.0-7.5) 
Blood bag centrifugation 615 (520-800) 10 (10-700) 
Gravity Sedimentation 935(700-1200) 2900 (700-3800) 
Adapted from (Feige, Ehrat et al. 2003) 
Plasma and serums are given in large quantities (measured in liters rather than milliliters). A liter 
of plasma or serum containing only 2.5 red cells per microliter from an infected donor with a low 
parasitemia (0.05 percent) could contain 1,250 infected red cells. As the red cell contamination of 
the product increases, so does the number of infected red cells per liter. Note that T. equi 
replicates in equine white blood cells following a bite by infected tick. It is unknown how this 
relates to iatrogenic horse-to-horse transmission. 
A wide variety of commercial plasma and serum products are available. However, under the 
Virus, Serum, and Toxins Act, only products that make specific “disease prevention or treatment 
claims” are required to have a license by the USDA. In order to obtain a license, these products 
must meet various conditions for safety and efficacy. Most relevant to this assessment, USDA 
licensed products are required to take certain steps to ensure that donor horses are free of 
infectious diseases. Donor horses must be clinically healthy and maintained at a licensed facility 
in a closed herd. New donors must be quarantined. Donors also are tested for piroplasmosis prior 
to entering the herd, however, no specific test is recommended, and yearly testing is not required. 
Therefore, some infected animals may be undetected (see section 3.3).  
Products may be exempted from federal licensing requirements if licensed under a State program 
for intrastate movement if State requirements meet Federal standards (Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 
2006; Evans 2010; USDA 2010a). As of 2009, the only program that met Federal requirements 
was California. The use of a licensed product is recommended whenever possible (AAEP 2009). 
There are no red or white blood cell contamination limits for USDA licensed products (Evans 
2010).  
Currently, there are only three USDA licensed producers of equine plasma; all of these use 
plasmapheresis. Some commercial plasma products produced by plasmapheresis are guaranteed 
by the manufacturer to be free of all blood cells (Hardefeldt, Keuler et al. 2010). Plasmapheresis 
requires a special machine, and there are no commercially available systems designed for use in 
horses. Therefore, firms that use plasmapheresis to produce plasma must take the time and 
expense to modify a human machine. The licensed serum producers currently use sedimentation 
or centrifugation (Evans 2010).  
Equine blood and serum products that do not make specific disease prevention or treatment 
claims fall under the regulatory authority of the Food and Drug Administration’s Center for 
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Veterinary Medicine (CVM). However, these products are low regulatory priority for the CVM, 
and there is no official approval process in place (Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 2006; AAEP 2009). 
Administration of unlicensed products within the context of a veterinary client patient 
relationship is legal (Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 2006; Evans 2010). In a 2009 white paper, the 
American Association of Equine Practitioners concluded that “equine plasma and serum products 
which make no disease or treatment claims are manufactured and sold without regulatory 
oversight.” Therefore, veterinarians cannot be assured of the disease status of donor horses, or the 
quality of the process used to create the product. These products are most likely produced using 
centrifugation or sedimentation methods. 
The likelihood that the donor will be EP infected is determined by management practices and 
testing of donors. The testing process for licensed products reduces the likelihood of using an 
infected donor, though infected donors may not be detected on all tests. Under the assumptions in 
this document, confirmed cases would not be allowed to enter into commercial plasma or serum 
production. In addition, horses with a known history of residence on a premises with an EP 
infected horse would be unlikely to be used as a donor, but, as described previously, these horses 
may not be identified. Horses used as donors in production of unlicensed products are less likely 
to be tested for EP, though no specific information is available on the practices of this industry. 
No information was available on the amount of plasma and serum products used in the equine 
industry. 
In summary, the majority of plasma and serum products will have blood cell contamination. 
Administration of large volumes increases recipient exposure to potentially parasitized cells. 
Even at very low levels of contamination and an EP infected donor with very low parasitemia, a 
liter of plasma or serum could contain over 1,000 infected red cells. Therefore, the risk of 
transmission if the donor is infected with either EP pathogen is high. The uncertainty surrounding 
this estimate is low. 
4.4.5. Contaminated Equipment 
Contaminated hypodermic needles, syringes, and surgical instruments have been implicated as 
sources or potential sources of EP pathogen transmission (Callow 1984; Hermann, Baumann et 
al. 1987; Friedhoff 1988; Gerstenberg, Allen et al. 1999; Rothschild and Knowles 2007; CFSPH 
2008; DAFF 2008; OIE 2009d; OIE 2009c). Reuse of syringes (but not needles) in a group of 
horses that had been bled regularly over several years resulted in T. equi infection of 61/66 
horses. This scenario led to exposure to very small to miniscule amounts of blood, but resulted in 
very high transmission rates (Gerstenberg, Allen et al. 1999). When blood smears of 8 CF and 
IFAT positive mares were examined, parasites were identified in 4 mares, and parasitemia was 
less than 0.1 percent in all mares. 
A small number of studies have examined residual blood volume in needles and syringes in 
human needlestick injuries and needle/syringe sharing. Needlesticks with 21 or 22 gauge needles 
transferred less than 1 microliter of blood (Hoffman, Larkin et al. 1989; Gaughwin, Gowans et al. 
1991). These studies were designed to model accidental needle injuries sustained by health care 
professionals, in which the needle is in contact with the stick victim for a very short amount of 
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time and penetrates skin or muscle. Subcutaneous or intramuscular injections in horses may be 
given with larger needles, and the needle remains inside the animal for enough time to inject a 
volume of fluid.  
In needle sharing studies designed to simulate shared use of a needle and syringe for intravenous 
use, blood is drawn back into the syringe until just visible to check placement in the vein. Using a 
2ml syringe and 25 gauge needle, one author demonstrated that a mean volume of 34 microliters 
of blood was transferred to the next user, with a range of 18-67 microliters over 20 trials 
(Hoffman, Larkin et al. 1989). Another research team estimated that the amount of blood 
transferred to the first subsequent user with a re-used or shared 22 gauge needle/1 ml syringe, and 
a re-used or shared 20 gauge needle/2ml syringe was approximately 0.5 and 5 microliters, 
respectively. When 0.5ml of blood was drawn into the syringe and ejected twice, the amount of 
blood transferred was up to 5 times greater. Washing with tap water decreased, but did not 
eliminate, transfer of blood. The authors concluded that regardless of the initial amount of blood 
contamination or washing, 2ml syringes transfer significantly more blood to a subsequent user 
than 1ml syringes (Gaughwin, Gowans et al. 1991). Another author hypothesized that the reason 
for this difference is the presence of a hub for a detachable needle on 2ml syringes. The hub 
creates a space between the plunger and the needle, which holds additional liquid, even when the 
plunger is fully depressed (Grund and Stern 1991).  
In equine practice, the needles and syringes used for blood collection or intravenous 
administration of substances are generally larger than the equipment used in humans. This creates 
additional space for residual blood to collect. In addition, equipment such as intravenous 
administration sets and dental equipment can also transfer blood between horses.  
As discussed above, previous incidents have demonstrated that the relatively small amounts of 
blood on contaminated needles and equipment can transmit the EP pathogens. As shown in Table 
13 from 4.3, even a horse with an unrealistically low total number of red cells (2x109/ml), and a 
very low parasitemia (0.05 percent) will have 106 infected cells per milliliter, or 1,000 infected 
cells in one microliter of blood. Based on the studies above, contaminated needles and syringes 
that have been used for venipuncture in horses could realistically have at least 5 microliters of 
residual blood, for 20,000 infected cells given an infected horse with mid-range red cell numbers 
(8x109/ml) a low parasitemia (0.05 percent).  
Washing with water only is likely to remove some, but not all blood (Gaughwin, Gowans et al. 
1991). The addition of a detergent will increase the amount of organic material, including blood, 
that is removed (Rutala, Weber et al. 2008). The efficacy of disinfectants against intraerythrocytic 
pathogens like the EP pathogens is not well described, as these pathogens are assumed to have 
limited survival time outside the host (OIE 2009f). 
The likelihood of exposure to contaminated veterinary equipment is determined by management 
practices. It is assumed that equipment contaminated with blood from a known infected horse 
would be cleaned prior to use, but cleaning may not be sufficient to eliminate EP infectivity. The 
American Association of Equine Practioners has published biosecurity information, 
recommendations and guidelines for equine practitioners (AAEP 2006). These guidelines do not 
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mention use or reuse of needles or other equipment. The recent APHIS information sheet clearly 
recommends against needle resuse and other risky practices, such as reusing uncleaned dental and 
surgical equipment (USDA 2010b).  
No information is available regarding the duration of B. caballi or T. equi infectivity on 
contaminated equipment. Based on documented instances of transmission and the relatively high 
number of organisms present in even very small amounts of blood, the risk of transmission of 
either EP pathogen resulting from exposure to contaminated veterinary equipment is high. The 
uncertainty surrounding this estimate is medium due to the lack of information regarding the 
survival of the organisms.  
4.4.6. Germplasm 
Horse germplasm is considered here as a commodity already harvested from the source horse. 
Theoretically, pathogen-contaminated blood associated with germplasm from an infected horse 
could be a pathogen source (Metcalf 2001). Under the assumptions in this risk assessment, the 
germplasm would be collected from the infected horse after it had been allowed to move from a 
piroplasmosis quarantined premises. We found no reports of EP pathogen detection in equid 
germplasm, and no reports of pathogen transmission from contaminated germplasm. We found no 
reports that EP is transmitted venereally or through assisted reproduction.  
Because of the lack of evidence that equid germplasm is associated with transmission of EP and 
handling that limits blood contamination, germplasm from an infected horse moved off 
quarantined premises poses negligible risk for EP spread. 
4.5. Overall Risk of Exposure _____________________________________________  
The overall risk of exposure is based on the likelihood of successful transmission to an uninfected 
horse via the exposure pathway.  
Table 14. Risk of exposure pathways.
 Exposure Pathway 
B. caballi T. equi 
Risk Uncertainty Risk Uncertainty 
Ticks Infected tick moving off 
quarantined premises 
Low Medium Low Medium  
Ticks on premises Low High Low High 
Vertical Vertical transmission Negligible Low Moderate Medium 
Iatrogenic Blood transfusion (medical 
purposes) 
High Low High Low 
Blood doping High Low High Low 
Commercial serum/blood plasma High Low High Low 
Contaminated equipment High Medium High Medium 
Germplasm Negligible Low Negligible Low 
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5. OVERALL RISK ESTIMATION 
The overall estimation of risk is based on the risk of release, the likelihood of exposure, and the 
likelihood that exposure leads to transmission. As discussed, simple horse-to-horse contact is not 
sufficient to transmit EP. Several exposure pathways, including tick transmission, vertical 
transmission, and iatrogenic mechanisms were examined.  
This assessment examined the likelihood that the EP pathogen would leave a quarantined 
premises (release) and subsequently cause infection of a naïve horse (exposure). The exposure 
pathways examined are shown in Table 15. 
Ticks pose a low risk of introducing or spreading infection onto a new premises. Iatrogenic 
transmission of blood from transfusions, blood doping, contaminated equipment, and commercial 
serum/blood plasma products is the most likely mechanism for new horses to acquire infection 
and mitigation efforts should focus on measures to ensure that infected horses, including those 
that are test negative, are not used for these purposes.  
The movement of confirmed positive horses poses a high risk of EP release from a quarantined 
premises. It is assumed these horses undergo stringent biosecurity measures to minimize contact 
with uninfected horses. However, if iatrogenic exposure does occur, the risk of transmission is 
high. Therefore, the overall risk of this pathway is moderate. Additional enforcement to ensure 
iatrogenic exposure does not occur would minimize this risk.  
The movement of infected undetected horses poses a low risk of EP release, however after 
released from a quarantined premises, these horse are presumed to move freely in the population. 
No additional testing, acaricide treatment, or identification is required of this population. It is 
unknown how frequently iatrogenic exposure occurs and any iatrogenic exposure is likely to 
result in infection, therefore the overall risk of this pathway is moderate.  
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Table 15. Overall risk estimation. 
Exposure Pathways  
Release Pathways 
Confirmed Positive Horse Infected Undetected Horse 
T. equi B. caballi T. equi B. caballi 
CF and cELISA Risk of release High High Low Low 
cELISA only Risk of release High High Low Moderate 
Ticks attached to horse 
leaving quarantined 
premises 
Risk of Transmission Low Low Low* Low 
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low Low Low 
Ticks in environment Risk of Transmission Low Low Low Low 
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low High High 
Vertical Transmission Risk of Transmission Moderate Negligible Moderate  Negligible 
Likelihood of Exposure High High High High 
Blood transfusion- 
medical 
Risk of Transmission High High High High 
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low High high 
Blood doping Risk of Transmission High High High High 
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low High High 
Commercial 
Serum/Plasma 
Risk of Transmission High High High High 
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low High High 
Contaminated Equipment Risk of Transmission High High High High 
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low High High 
Germplasm Risk of Transmission Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible  
Likelihood of Exposure Low Low High High 
Overall Risk  Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
*Moderate when male ticks of the following species are infected D.variabilis, A. cajennense, and R. microplus 
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6. DATA LIMITATIONS 
6.1. Ticks _____________________________________________________________  
The high degree of uncertainty about these risk estimations is based on lack of available data. To 
gain a better understanding of the role of U.S. tick species in EP transmission, additional work is 
needed to understand the ecology of these vectors, density, and distribution. Transmission studies 
with U.S. tick species are also needed to better understand the unique cycle of transmission. In 
addition, studies are needed to better understand acaricide efficacy on cayenne tick or how 
effective it will remain over time.  
6.2. Biosecurity ________________________________________________________  
Additional information is also needed about biosecurity practices in various industries so that 
mitigation efforts can focus on the sectors of highest risk. USDA is currently unable to measure 
how well these mitigation measures are being implemented or enforced.  
6.3. Test Performance ___________________________________________________  
Due to the differences in cELISA tests available for EP, additional information is needed to 
compare NVSL versus licensed kit cELISA performance on B. caballi organisms.  
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APPENDIX A. LITERATURE REVIEW OF EP RELEASE AND EXPOSURE 
Location of 
introduction 
or spread 
Estimated 
Introduction 
(year) 
Index case 
detected 
(year) Pathogen 
Source of 
introduction 
Mechanism 
of spread Summary of outbreak References 
Release and Exposure 
United States 
(Florida) 
1959 or 1960 1961 B. caballi Walking Horses 
from Cuba 
D. nitens  372 cases of B. caballi 
infection in horses in 
Florida until 1969  
(Sippel, Cooperrider et 
al. 1962; Cooperrider 
1963; Taylor, Bryant et 
al. 1969; Knowles 
1988) 
Australia 1950s and 
1960s 
1976 T. equi Quarter horses 
from Texas 
Needle 
sharing 
Total number infected 
not reported; includes 
more than 50 locally 
bred horses. 
(Callow 1984) 
Switzerland Unknown 1985 T. equi Horse of 
unknown origin 
Needle 
sharing 
Fourteen racehorses 
on one premises. 
(Hermann, Baumann et 
al. 1987) 
United 
Kingdom 
1981 1996 T. equi Horse from 
North Africa 
Syringe reuse 61/66 mares in an 
experimental herd of 
horses and donkeys 
(Gerstenberg, Allen et 
al. 1999) 
United 
Kingdom 
≥8 years 
prior to 
detection 
Not reported T. equi Horses from 
Portugal 
Vertical At least four infected 
horses were imported 
(three mares and one 
stallion). Vertical 
transmission from one 
mare to at least two 
offspring. 
(Phipps and Otter 2004) 
United States 
(Florida) 
Not reported 2008 T. equi Two horses 
from Mexico 
Needle 
sharing 
Twenty horses on 
seven premises. 
(OIE 2009d)  
Ireland Not reported 2009 T. equi Reported as “an 
animal” 
returning from 
an EP endemic 
region 
Iatrogenic Fifty horses on six 
premises 
(OIE 2009e) 
Release only 
Australia 1970s 1976 T. equi Andalusian 
horses from 
Spain 
No spread 
reported 
Thirty horses in three 
geographic regions of 
Australia. 
(Callow, McGregor et 
al. 1979; Callow 1984) 
United States 
(California) 
1988 1993 T. equi Horse from 
France, or 
exposure in 
Florida 
No spread 
reported 
One Selle Français 
warmblood gelding. 
(Holman, Hietala et al. 
1997) 
Germany Within one 
year prior to 
detection 
1997-1999 B. caballi & 
T. equi 
Horses from 
various 
countries in 
Europe, Russia, 
and Ukraine 
No spread 
reported 
Eighteen horses. (Zahler and Gothe 
2000) 
Hong Kong 1999 2000 T. equi Horse from 
South Africa 
No spread 
reported 
One Thoroughbred 
gelding. 
(Sippel, Cooperrider et 
al. 1962) 
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Location of 
introduction 
or spread 
Estimated 
Introduction 
(year) 
Index case 
detected 
(year) Pathogen 
Presumed 
Source of 
introduction 
Mechanism 
of spread Summary of outbreak References 
Australia 2000 2000 T. equi Horse from 
Hong Kong 
No spread 
reported 
One Thoroughbred 
gelding. 
 (Ellis 2000) 
United 
Kingdom 
Not reported Not reported B. caballi Horse from 
Portugal 
No spread 
reported 
One mare. 
Seropositive for both T. 
equi and B. caballi. 
(Phipps and Otter 
2004) 
Exposure only, or insufficient information to categorize 
Panama Not reported 1913 B. caballi Horses in 
Panama 
D. nitens or 
A. 
cajennense 
One “American driving 
horse”, shipped from 
the United States to 
the Panama Canal 
Zone; developed 
clinical signs 4 days 
after exposure to 
“native ponies” and 
ticks. Reported as "the 
first record of the 
parasite (B. caballi) in 
America". 
 (Darling 1913) 
Panama Not reported 1922 Not 
reported 
Horses in 
Panama 
D. nitens Seventeen Army 
horses in the Panama 
Canal Zone 
(Kelser 1922) 
United States 
(multiple 
States) 
Not reported 1962-1969 B. caballi Exposure to 
horses from 
Florida or 
Puerto Rico 
Not reported Number of infected 
horses: Arkansas, 2; 
Georgia, 4; Mississippi, 
1; New Jersey, 6; 
North Carolina, 2; 
Tennessee, 26 
(Taylor, Bryant et al. 
1969) 
United States 
(Florida) 
Not reported 1964 B. caballi 
&T. equi 
Not reported Not reported One horse (Riek 1964) 
United States 
(Florida) 
Not reported 1965 T. equi Not reported Not reported One Thoroughbred 
horse in southern 
Florida 
(Knowles, Mathis et al. 
1966; Holbrook and 
Frerichs 1968) 
United States 
(New Jersey) 
1967 1967 T. equi Not reported Not reported One horse on U.S. 
Olympic jumping team, 
returning from France 
(Holbrook and Frerichs 
1968; Taylor, Bryant et 
al. 1969) 
Not reported Not reported 1977 T. equi Horses from 
Jordan 
Needle 
sharing 
Number of horses not 
reported. 
(Knowles 1988) 
Switzerland Not reported 1994 T. equi Not reported Tick? (weak 
evidence). 
First documented 
autochthonous case of 
EP in Switzerland.  
(Gottstein, Pauli et al. 
1995; Sigg, Gerber et 
al. 2010) 
United States 
(Missouri) 
Not reported 2009 T. equi Not reported Needle 
sharing 
Eight quarter horses  (OIE 2009b)  
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Location of 
introduction 
or spread 
Estimated 
Introduction 
(year) 
Index case 
detected 
(year) Pathogen 
Source of 
introduction 
Mechanism 
of spread 
Summary of 
outbreak References 
United States 
(multiple 
States) 
Not reported 2009 T. equi Not reported A. 
cajennense  
Event not yet resolved; 
408 horses in seven 
States (TX, AL, CO, 
LA, IN, NC, TN) 
(USDA Sit Rep, Nov 2010, 
unpublished) 
United States 
(multiple 
States) 
Not reported 2009 T. equi Not reported Not reported Event not yet resolved; 
79 cases in six States 
(NM, TX, CO, OK, GA, 
NC). 
 (OIE 2010b) 
United States- 
New Mexico 
Not reported 2010 B. caballi Not reported Management 
practices  
One Quarter horse 
race pony 
(euthanized) 
(OIE 2010c)  
United States 
(multiple 
States) 
Not reported 2010 B. caballi   Event not yet resolved. 
Horse in NM: “under 
quarantine” per July 
19, 2010 OIE 
immediate notification 
report; implies that this 
is not the same horse 
(euthanized) as listed 
in row above. 
As of OIE follow-up 
report 1: one horse in 
each of NM, TX, and 
IA. 
(OIE 2010a)  
United 
Kingdom 
Not reported 2010 Not 
reported 
Not reported Not reported In an OIE immediate 
notification report on 
equine infectious 
anemia: “The horse 
was also found to be 
positive for 
piroplasmosis.” 
(OIE 2010d) 
Cuba  1951 
 (report date) 
B. caballi 
and T. equi 
 D. nitens “A group of horses that 
the Cuban army 
purchased from the 
United States” 
(Roby, Anthony et al. 1964) 
secondary ref.; primary 
requested (de la Fuente, 
Naranjo et al. 2004) 
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APPENDIX B. BETA DISTRIBUTIONS  
  
B.  B. caballi CF Sensitivity A. B. caballi cElisa Sensitivity 
C. T. equi cELISA Sensitivity D. T Equi CF Sensitivity 
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APPENDIX C. PERFORMANCE OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OVER TIME 
Organism: T. equi 
 Time to Detection Time to Negative Test 
  Blood 
Smear CF IFAT cELISA 
Blood 
Smear CF IFAT cELISA 
Infection 
Method Reference 
  11-20 
days 
7-14 
days 
  364-455 
days 
63-174 
days 
>476 
days 
  Inoculation of 
sporozoites 
(Tenter and 
Friedhoff 1986a)  
  2 weeks  3 weeks   8 
weeks 
 >115 
weeks 
Inoculation (Knowles, 
Kappmeyer et al. 
1992)  
  2 weeks  7 weeks   10- 
>115 
weeks 
 >115 
weeks 
Experimental 
tick 
transmission 
(Knowles, 
Kappmeyer et al. 
1992) 
4.7 days   1 week 11 days   >22 
weeks 
Inoculation of 
erythrocytes 
(Cunha, McGuire et 
al. 2006)  
13 days   3 weeks 7 weeks   >22 
weeks 
Experimental 
tick 
transmission 
(Cunha, McGuire et 
al. 2006)  
2-4 days 2-10 
days 
3-20 
days 
2-19 
days 
4-17 
days 
>220 
days 
>220 
days 
>220 
days 
 (Weiland 1986) 
  30.4 
days 
21.9 
days 
    540- 
>540 
days 
>540 
days 
  Inoculation of 
erythrocytes 
(Kuttler, Goff et al. 
1988) 
 
Organism: B. caballi  
 
Time to Detection Time to Negative Test 
  Sample 
Size 
Blood 
Smear CF IFAT cELISA 
Blood 
Smear CF IFAT cELISA 
Infection 
Method Reference 
3   13-15 
days 
10-11 
days 
    80-140 
days 
>190 
days 
  Inoculation 
of 
erythrocytes 
(Tenter and 
Friedhoff 1986a) 
6 10-15 
days 
12-17 
days 
 5-15 
days 
11-15 
days 
>30 
days 
 >30 
days 
 (Ikadai, Osorio et 
al. 2000) 
9 2-4 days 2-10 
days 
3-20 days 2-19 
days 
4-17 
days 
67 days >220 
days 
>220 
days 
 (Weiland 1986) 
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